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Modifications of Antitrust Consent Decrees: Over a Double 
Barrel 
INTRODUCTION 
A court that enters an initial antitrust consent decree1 has the in-
herent power to modify2 that decree. 3 This power derives from the 
fact that a consent decree is an injunction, over which a court has 
continuing equity jurisdiction.4 Motions requesting modifications of 
this decree can be made by either the defendant or the Justice Depart-
ment.5 Often one party will file a motion to modify, to which the 
1. An antitrust consent decree is "an order of the court agreed upon by representatives of the 
Attorney General . • • in proceedings instituted under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, or 
related ,statutes." ANTrrRusr SUBCOMM., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86ru CONG., lsr SESS., 
REPORT ON TIIE CoNSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF TIIE DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ix (Comm. Print 
1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 REPORT]. Consent decrees are attractive to antitrust defendants 
because § 5(a) of the Clayton Act states that a consent decree "entered before any testimony has 
been taken" cannot be used as evidence in a private treble damage action. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (a) 
(1982). Conversely, a decree entered through litigation "shall be prima facie evidence against 
[the] defendant in any [private] action" against that defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982). 
The Justice Department also favors consent decrees because they allow the Department to 
settle a case quickly and to direct its manpower to the prosecution of the most serious antitrust 
violations. The Department settles a "very high percentage" of its antitrust cases through con· 
sent decrees. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act: Hearings on S. 782 & S. 1088 Before 
the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. Between 1955 and 1967, consent decrees 
were entered in 81% of the Department's antitrust actions. Id. at 7. 
For a discussion of the entry of consent decrees, see Note, The Scope of Judicial Review of 
Consent Decrees Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 82 MICH. L. REV. 153 
(1983). 
2. Unless otherwise noted, "modification" refers to modification or termination of extant 
antitrust consent decrees. Some of the cases and literature use the term "modify" in reference to 
modification of an initial proposal for a consent decree. This Note refers to such situations as 
"amendments." 
3. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). 
4. "We are not doubtful of the power of a court of equity to modify an injunction in adapta· 
tion to changed conditions though it was entered by consent. • . • A continuing decree of in· 
junction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the 
need." United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932); see also System Fedn. v. Wright, 
364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) (''The source of the power to modify is of course the fact that an 
injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing court and always a continuing 
willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable 
relief."); Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 CoLUM. L. REV. I, 24 (1972) 
(The power to modify comes from 
the historic role of the Courts of Chancery and from the unique nature of injunctive relief 
itself. Traditionally, the courts have recognized that because an injunctive proceeding is "of 
a continuing nature," and because the power of a court of equity to enforce injunctions and 
to punish for their violation "continues for all time," there must also exist a correlative 
power to refuse to punish, and to modify or vacate injunctions .••• 
(footnotes omitted)). 
5. In the case of government-filed antitrust suits, the Justice Department is the acting plain· 
tiff. This Note will use "Justice Department" and "government" interchangeably. 
134 
October 1985] Note - Modifications of Antitrust Consent Decrees 135 
other will consent. 6 On occasion, however, the nonmoving party will 
withhold its consent. 7 The standard for modification in contested 
cases is different and significantly more difficult to meet than the stan-
dard in consented-to cases. s 
In 1974, Congress passed the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties 
Act9 ("APPA" or the "Act"). The APPA requires that the govern-
ment and the defendant follow certain procedures10 before a court 
may consider an initial consent decree. After these procedures have 
been complied with, the court must make an independent public inter-
est determination before entering the decree. I I There is some ques-
6. In recent years, the Justice Department has taken an active role in modifying consent 
decrees. In a 1984 press release, the Department announced a desire to modify decrees that it 
feels "may no longer be in the public interest." United States Dept. of Justice Release at 2 (Apr. 
27, 1984). The release invited any defendants "who believe their judgments ought to be modified 
or terminated" to contact the division, noting that since 1981 "some 400 outstanding judgments 
have been reviewed for possible termination or modification." Id. at 2-3. 
A Justice Department official, in an interview reported in 1981 .ANrrrRusr & TRADE REG. 
REP. (BNA) No. 1032, at A-16 (Sept. 24, 1981), explained the Department's position on extant 
consent decrees and noted that "Justice plans to look with suspicion on decrees over 10 years old. 
'After 10 years, a decree is either going to work or it is not going to work.' " The official esti-
mated that about 1,000 decrees were more than 10 years old. Id. (quoting Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, 
Special Assistant, Antitrust Division of the Justice Dept.). 
7. See, e.g., United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del 1942) (defendant 
contested government attempt to vacate decree), appeal dismissed, 318 U.S. 796 (1943). 
8. In contested cases, at least where the defendant seeks modification, the stringent Swift 
standard applies. "Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and 
unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of litigation with 
the consent of all concerned." United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). For a 
fuller description of contested modifications, see notes 42-58 infra and accompanying text. 
In consented-to cases, the courts have been fairly deferential to the parties. In most cases, the 
court will follow the Justice Department's lead and modify a decree in accordance with the 
Department's wishes. See, e.g., United States v. Aerofin Corp., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
~ 62,598 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. First Natl. City Bank, 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 62,223 
(S.D.N.Y.); United States v. United Fruit Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 62,001 (E.D. La.). 
See also Zimmerman, The Antitrust Division's Decree Review and Private Litigation Programs, 51 
ANTrrRusr L.J. 105, 113 (1982) (Courts generally approve consented-to modifications without 
significant comment.); Note, Construction and Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees: New 
Approaches After the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 296, 304 
n.71 (1977) ("Where the parties have agreed to modification, judicial approval tends to be pro 
forma."); notes 59-63 infra and accompanying text. 
9. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982) (also called the "Tunney Act"). 
10. The Act makes the government responsible for evaluating the competitive act and notify-
ing the public of the proposed decree. The government must then accept public comment for 60 
days. 
For a description of the Justice Department's current procedures, see ABA ANTrrRusr SEC-
TION, ANTITRUSf CONSENT DECREE MANUAL (1979). 
11. The APP A provides that: 
Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the United States under this section, the 
court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public interest. For the 
purpose of such determination, the court may consider -
(1) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations, 
provisions for enforcement and modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated effects of 
alternative remedies actually considered, and any other considerations bearing upon the ade-
quacy of such judgment; 
(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and individuals alleg-
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tion, however, whether the Act's requirements must be followed in 
cases in which a modification of a consent decree is sought, 12 or 
whether these requirements serve merely as a guide to such 
modifications. 
This Note will attempt to determine the correct standard of review 
for all modifications of existing consent decrees. Part I. A. examines 
the current standards for modifications of consent decrees. It con-
cludes that the APP A does not apply to such orders. Part I. B. then 
examines the differing standards that are currently applied to defen-
dant-initiated modification motions without the government's consent, 
government-initiated modification motions without the defendant's 
consent, and consented-to modifications. Part II argues that these va-
rying standards have little justification since the same substantive con-
cerns exist in all modification cases. Part III explores the two major 
concerns - (1) the public interest and (2) the integrity of judicial or-
ders - and urges courts to evaluate modification motions in light of 
these concerns. Part IV contends that courts making decisions under 
this "two-prong standard" should give deference to the government's 
view of the modification's propriety. The Note concludes by illustrat-
ing how courts should apply this double-barrel analysis to modifica-
tion requests. 
I. CURRENT JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR MODIFICATIONS OF 
CONSENT DECREES 
Since the passage of the APP A, 13 the standards for modifications 
ing specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of 
the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial. 
15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982). 
12. See notes 13-41 infra and accompanying text. 
13. Congress adopted the APP A after years of negative publicity surrounding consent de· 
crees. In 1959, the House antitrust subcommittee issued a report severely criticizing the Justice 
Department's use of consent decrees. 1959 REPORT, supra note 1. The report was largely in-
spired by the events surrounding United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 
68,246 (D.N.J.). There, a consent decree was entered amidst accusations of collusion between 
the Justice Department and AT&T. The subcommittee twice requested the AT&T files, but the 
Attorney General refused, claiming that the files were confidential and could not, in the interests 
of the case, be disclosed. 1959 REPORT, supra note 1, at xi. The subcommittee, however, was not 
persuaded: 
The extent to which the Department of Justice went to withhold information from the com· 
mittee in this investigation is unparalleled in the committee's experience. The Department's 
attitude implied that the reluctance to provide information to the committee resulted from a 
desire to cover up those facts which the Department considered to be embarrassing. 
Id. at 13. 
After a lengthy examination of the Western Electric case (and of United States v. Atlantic 
Ref. Co., No. 14060 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1941), vacated, No. 14060 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 1982)), the 
subcommittee concluded that "[t]he element of secrecy that surrounds the entire consent decree 
program is contrary to the general policy established by Congress ... that antitrust enforcement 
proceedings shall be public." 1959 REPORT, supra note 1, at 304. The subcommittee's recom-
mendation was that the "Department of Justice ... should provide notice to the public [of the 
proposed consent decree and establish] a waiting period after there has been agreement between 
the Government and the defendant." Id. The Justice Department responded by implementing a 
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of consent decrees have been unclear. 14 Most courts have not dis-
cussed whether the Act applies to modifications. A few courts seem to 
be avoiding the issue.1s However, at least one court, 16 and arguably a 
second,17 have held that the APPA does apply to modifications of ex-
isting consent decrees. 
This section argues that both the plain language and the legislative 
history of the APP A suggest that the Act does not apply to modifica-
tions of consent decrees. In addition, this section contends that differ-
ent standards currently apply to the different types of modifications. 
A. Applicability of the APPA 
The only case expressly holding that the APP A does apply to mod-
ifications is United States v. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-
tion. 18 However, the district court offered no reasons for why the 
APP A should apply in this case. Instead, it merely mandated, in a 
single sentence, that the parties comply with the Act. 19 In so doing, 
30-day waiting period between government/defendant consent and judicial entry of the decree 
during which the public could comment on the proposed decree. See Senate Hearings, supra note 
1, at 2. 
In 1972, Congress again became dissatisfied with the Justice Department's consent decree 
program. After extensive hearings - citing the same issues as were explored in the 1959 Report 
- Congress passed the APP A. The Act addressed Congress' primary concerns by requiring the 
Justice Department, before obtaining a consent decree, to: (1) issue a competitive impact state-
ment (CIS), (2) publish notice of the proposed consent decree in the Federal Register and news-
papers of general circulation, and (3) accept - for 60 days before entry - public comments. 
The court, in turn, is required to make a public interest determination before entering the decree. 
15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982). The Act explicitly applies only to the initial entry of a consent 
decree, see notes 28-30 infra, and contains no reference to modifications. 
For a more thorough inquiry into the APPA and the initial construction of consent decrees, 
see Branfman, Antitrust consent decrees - a review and evaluation of the first seven years under 
the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 303 (1982); Kalodner, Consent 
Decrees as an Antitrust Enforcement Device, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 277 (1978); Note, supra note 
8; Note, Judicial Review of Antitrust Consent Decrees: Reconciling Judicial Responsibility With 
Executive Discretion, 35 HAsrINGS L.J. 133 (1983); Note, supra note 1. 
14. See generally Note, supra note l; Note, supra note 8; Note, Flexibility and Finality in 
Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1303 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, Flexibility 
and Finality]. 
15. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 65,614, at 
69,093 (N.D. Ill.) ("In the instance of a modification of a consent decree, [the APPA] may or 
may not [apply]; but fortunately for me, I don't have to decide that in this instance. [However, 
i]n the instance of termination or vacation of a decree it is my conclusion that it does not."); 
American Express Co. v. United States Dept. of Justice, 453 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Amer-
ican Express argued that "the APP A is as applicable to a 'consented-to motion to vacate or 
modify an existing consent decree' as it is to a 'proposal for a consent decree' "; the court held 
that the issue was not properly before it.) (quoting Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum at 3). 
16. United States v. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 64,370 (C.D. 
Cal.). The Court held that the APPA did apply to modification of an existing consent decree but 
did not explain the reasons underlying its decision. 
17. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (discussed at notes 21-26 
infra), ajfd. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (mem.). 
18. 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 64,370 (D.D.C.). 
19. "[T]he parties hereto shall comply with the provisions of the Antitrust Procedures and 
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the court ignored a substantial body of cases that have utilized the 
APP A's public interest standard as a guide but have stopped short of 
holding that the actual requirements of the Act apply to 
modifications. 20 
A series of decisions in the government's antitrust suit against 
AT&T (United States v. AT&T)21 also suggests that the APPA applies 
to modifications. In particular, Federal District Judge Greene, the au-
thor of several of these decisions, 22 has indicated that the APP A 
should apply to consented-to modifications. Although Judge Greene 
was never required to decide whether the APP A applies to modifica-
tions because the parties before him agreed to follow the Act, his lan-
guage suggests that he would require parties modifying consent 
decrees to comply with APP A procedures. 23 
Judge Greene's opinions were, unfortunately, confused. Although 
the action was clearly one involving a modification of an existing de-
cree, he did not make this clear. Indeed, Greene obscured the differ-
ence between a modification and an initial proposal. For instance, 
when he certified the case for direct appeal to the Supreme Court,24 
Greene stated that one of the issues presented by the case was "the 
extent of the power of a district court to require modifications of a 
Penalties Act as therein provided before the modified final judgment be presented to the court for 
approval." 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 64,370, at 74,704. 
20. See note 59 infra. 
21. There are a number of cases entitled "United States v. AT&T," most of which are con-
nected and many of which this Note will examine. 
22. The original AT&T action began in 1949 when the government brought a civil antitrust 
action. The action led to a 1956 consent decree in the District Court of New Jersey. The govern-
ment then filed a new action against AT&T in 1974. On January 10, 1982, the government and 
the defendant agreed to settle the case with a modification of the 1956 decree. That modification 
was approved by the New Jersey court the very next day. However, before filing the approved 
modification, the New Jersey court transferred the matter to the District Court for the District of 
Columbia (where Judge Greene assumed control of the case). For a good description of the 
case's history, see United States v. AT&T, 522 F. Supp. 131, 135-40 (D.D.C. 1982), ajfd. sub 
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (mem.). 
23. United States v. AT&T, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 64,476 (D.D.C.). In this particular 
opinion, Judge Greene allowed the parties to use the APPA, but he did not hold whether it 
applied. In a discussion with the counsel for both sides, Judge Greene argued that the reasons 
for passing the APP A seemed applicable to modifications. And, he said, "[I]t appears to me now 
that the Tunney Act procedures apply." United States v. AT&T, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
~ 64,465, at 72,611 (D.D.C.). Also, in a later opinion, Greene said "the parties here - and in 
similar antitrust actions - could subvert the expressed will of Congress by a mere act of label-
ling." United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 145 (D.D.C. 1982), ajfd. sub nom. Maryland v. 
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (mem.). 
See also Lasker [District Judge, S.D.N.Y.], The Tunney Act Revisited: The Role of the Court, 
52 ANTITRUST L.J. 937, 939 (1983) ("[I]n my opinion there is no reason to believe that [the 
APPA] does not apply as much to the consent modification of a decree, as to the framing of the 
original decree."). 
24. This case was certified for direct appeal under 15 U.S.C. §§ 28-29 (1982) (the Expediting 
Act). 
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consent decree in the exercise of its jurisdiction under" the APP A. 25 
However, Greene later commented that "[b ]efore the Court could ap-
prove the parties' proposed consent decree, it was required by the 
[APPA] . . . to determine whether the decree was 'in the public inter-
est.' "26 Thus, it is unclear whether Greene made the necessary dis-
tinction between initial (proposed) decrees and modifications. 
Although judges in Motor Vehlcles and AT&T would apply the 
APP A to modifications, neither the language of the Act nor the cir-
cumstances leading to its enactment warrant such a result. Rather, 
the proper conclusion drawn from examining the APP A and its his-
tory is that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to 
modifications. 27 
The most obvious argument supporting this conclusion is that the 
APP A does not prescribe procedures for modifications of consent de-
crees. 28 The Act mandates that "[a]ny proposal for a consent judg-
ment" must be filed with the district court. 29 The Act also indicates 
that "[b ]efore entering any consent judgment proposed by the United 
States," the court must determine its impact on the public interest.30 
Nowhere in the Act, however, is there a provision governing proce-
dures for the modification of existing decrees. Thus, two doctrines of 
statutory construction, the "plain meaning" rule and expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius ("the expression of one thing is the exclusion of 
another"31), defeat the argument that the Act applies to modifications. 
First, the plain meaning rule dictates that when the words of a 
statute are unambiguous, there is no room for extrastatutory interpre-
25. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCR) 11 65,130, at 71,311-12 
(D.D.C. 1982). 
26. United States v. AT&T, 592 F. Supp. 846, 856 (D.D.C. 1984) (emphasis added). 
27. The Justice Department is also of the opinion that the APPA does not apply to modifica-
tions: "We believe the decision [in Motor Vehicles] was incorrect because the APPA operates 
only when an initial consent decree is presented to a court for approval." Consent Decree Termi-
nation - Licensing Agreements, [1969-1983 Current Comment Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. 
REPT. (CCR) 11 50,443, at 56,017 n.4 (Jan. 10, 1983). Nevertheless, the Justice Department's 
current modification policy is to comply with the APP A at least in spirit. This "in spirit" com-
pliance basically consists of filing a public impact statement and waiting for 60 days before pro-
ceeding further with the action. See id. at 56,017 ("[O)ver the years, the department has adopted 
the refined policy of consenting to motions to modify or terminate judgments in antitrust actions 
only on the condition that an appropriate effort be undertaken to notify potentially interested 
persons of the pendency of the motion."); see also Baker, Antitrust in the Sunshine, United States 
Dept. of Justice Release at 6-7 (Jan. 26, 1977) (mentioning that the Department issued a compet-
itive impact statement in connection with the modification in United States v. General Elec. Co., 
1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCR) 11 61,659 (E.D. Penn.)). 
28. The APP A does, however, mention the need for the competitive impact statement (CIS) 
to include "a description of the procedures available for modification of such proposal." 15 
u.s.c. § 16(b)(5) (1982). 
29. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1982) (emphasis added). 
30. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982) (emphasis added). 
31. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979). 
140 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:134 
tation. 32 The Supreme Court has indicated that "the meaning of the 
statutes must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which 
the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the 
courts is to enforce it according to its terms."33 The language of the 
APP A is plain: it mandates certain procedures for consent decree pro-
posals, but not for modifications of existing consent decrees. 
A second maxim of statutory construction is that a statute that 
refers to enumerated items must be interpreted to exclude all items not 
mentioned.34 The APPA's inclusion of only proposed consent de-
crees, therefore, provides strong support for the argument that the Act 
does not apply to modifications.35 Thus, there are forceful arguments 
based solely on the language of the APP A for concluding that the Act 
does not apply to modifications of consent decrees. 
The legislative history of the APP A lends further support to the 
contention that the Act does not apply to modifications. While 
neither the House36 nor the Senate37 hearings significantly discuss 
modifications,38 (concentrating instead on the initial proposal and en-
try of consent decrees39), there is evidence that Congress was aware of 
the distinction between modifications and initial proposals. The con-
gressional drive to enact the APP A, for example, was based partly on 
a 1959 committee report that addressed consent decree modifica-
tions.40 The fact that Congress addressed the issue of modifications 
32. "If the language is plain, unambiguous, and uncontrolled by other parts of the act or 
other acts upon the same subject the court cannot give it a different meaning." 2A C. SANDS, 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 46.01, at 49 (1973). 
33. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). See also Frankfurter, Some Reflec-
tions on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 534 (1947) ("An omission al the time 
of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however much later 
wisdom may recommend the inclusion."). 
34. 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23, at 123 (1973). 
35. But see id. at 132 ("(W]here an expanded interpretation will accomplish beneficial re-
sults, serve the purpose for which the statute was enacted, is a necessary incidental to power or 
right, or is the established custom, usage or practice, the maxim will be disregarded and an 
expanded meaning given.") (footnotes omitted). 
36. Consent Decree Bills: Hearings on H.R. 9203, H.R. 9947 and S. 782 Before the Sub-
comm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. 
37. Senate Hearings, supra note 1. 
38. The hearings do contain some scattered references to modifications. See, e.g., Senate 
Hearings, supra note 1, at 89 (statement of T. Kauper, Asst. Atty. Gen., Antitrust Div.) (The 
APPA could involve court inquiry into "the procedure and standards to be applied for modifica-
tion of the judgment •.. . ");id. at 463 (letter ofR. Kleindienst, Acting Atty. Gen.) (describing 
the procedure used in United States v. Swift & Co., 1971-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 73,760 (N.D. 
Ill.), a case that involved a modification). 
39. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 36, at 38 (The act "would require that the Justice 
Department file and publish, along with the consent decree, a 'public impact' statement which 
explains the nature and purpose of ... the proposed consent decree ...• ") (emphasis added). 
40. A discussion of the modification of consent decrees can be found in 1959 REPORT, supra 
note l, at 2-6. The House and Senate Hearings and the APPA were partly a result of this report. 
See note 13 supra. 
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but chose not to mention them in the Act is persuasive evidence that 
Congress did not intend to bring modifications under the APPA.41 
Motor Vehicle's (and perhaps AT&T's) extension of the APPA to 
modifications is therefore not supported by either the wording of the 
statute or the relevant legislative history. 
B. Differing Standards 
Since the APP A does not apply to modifications, the relevant in-
quiry is what standards do guide the courts in entering consent decree 
modifications. In answering this question, it is important to take ac-
count of the varying situations in which courts are asked to consider 
proposed modifications. Consent decree modifications most often 
come about in situations in which both parties consent to the changes. 
Occasionally, however, a court will modify a decree when one party -
either the Government or the defendant - does not consent to the 
modification. This subsection will survey the differing standards that 
courts presently apply to defendant-initiated motions without the gov-
ernment's consent, government-initiated motions without the defen-
dant's consent, and proposals consented to by both parties. 
1. Defendant-Initiated Motions Without the Government's Consent: 
The Swift Doctrine 
In the leading case of United States v. Swift & Co., 42 the Supreme 
Court recognized a court's authority to modify a consent decree.43 In 
that case, the defendants - a group of meatpackers subject to a 
twelve-year-old consent decree - petitioned the district court to mod-
ify the decree. The court agreed to do so, despite the government's 
objection, and the case was appealed directly to the Supreme Court.44 
The Court established a strict standard that a defendant must meet 
in order to obtain a modification of an existing decree. The standard is 
whether the changes [in circumstances] are so important that dangers, 
41. Bills that would have extended the APP A to consented-to modifications have been intro-
duced in Congress. See, e.g., The Tunney Act: Oversight Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on 
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
These bills have never gotten beyond the committee stage. 
42. 286 U.S. 106 (1932). 
43. 286 U.S. at 114. The consent decree in Swift provided that ·~urisdiction of the cause was 
retained for the purpose of taking such other action or adding at the foot such other relief 'as 
may become necessary or appropriate for carrying out and enforcement' thereof, 'and for the 
purpose of entertaining ... any application which the parties may make' .... " 286 U.S. at 
111-12 (quoting the consent decree issued below). But the Court stated that a district court has 
equity power to modify a decree whether or not the decree includes a retention of jurisdiction 
clause. "If the reservation had been omitted," said the court, "power there still would be by 
force of principles inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery." 286 U.S. at 114. 
44. Under the Expediting Act, in force at the time of Swift, antitrust cases bypassed the 
courts of appeals and went directly to the Supreme Court. The Act was amended when the 
APPA was passed. 15 U.S.C. § 29(b) (1982) now requires the district judge to certify the case for 
direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Otherwise the case goes to the court of appeals. 
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once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow. Nothing 
less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unfore-
seen conditions should lead [a court] to change what was decreed after 
years of litigation with the consent of all concerned.45 
A moving defendant, therefore, must demonstrate each of the fol-
lowing conditions in order to obtain modification: (1) a change of cir-
cumstances sufficient to render "dangers, once substantial . . . 
attenuated to a shadow"; (2) extreme hardship; and (3) unforeseeabil-
ity.46 Swift's stringent criteria have led one court to remark that 
"modification is only cautiously to be granted."47 
2. Government-Initiated Motions Without the Defendant's Consent 
The present standard for modifying a consent decree in contested, 
government-initiated cases is not clear.48 Arguably, the language in 
Swift is broad enough to cover all types of modifications. In Chrysler 
Corp. v. United States, 49 however, the Supreme Court did not apply 
the stringent Swift standard to government-initiated modifications. 
Rather, the Court held that government-initiated motions for modifi-
cation should be granted or denied based on "whether the change 
[would serve] to effectuate or to thwart the basic purpose of the origi-
nal consent decree."50 
45. 286 U.S. at 119. Swift is still good law. One commentator has remarked that "the Swift 
doctrine is accepted today without question." Note, Flexibility and Finality, supra note 14, at 
1303. See also United States v. American Socy. of Composers, 586 F. Supp. 727, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984) ("[T]here can be no doubt that this Court is empowered to modify the Consent Judgment 
in response to changed conditions, regardless of the government's opposition. • • • The proper 
exercise of this power is, however, strictly limited .... " (citing Swift)); United States v. Con-
necticut Packaging Stores Assn., 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1f 60,174 (D. Conn.) (applying the 
Swift test where the defendant sought to modify a consent decree without the government's 
consent). 
46. "[T]he impropriety of merely relieving a party from the foreseeable detrimental conse-
quences of its consent, after it has enjoyed or speculated upon its favorable consequences or 
possibilities by avoiding the litigation and the hazards of a less favorable outcome, is quite mani-
fest." United States v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 209 F. Supp. 665, 668 (D. Utah 1962). 
47. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 813 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
395 U.S. 905 (1969). For an example of a case in which the defendant secured a modification 
without the government's consent, see United States v. Continental Can Co., 128 F. Supp. 932 
(N.D. Cal. 1955). In this case, the court modified a consent decree to allow defendant "reason-
able" instead of merely "compensatory" return on the rental of certain equipment. The court 
stated the relevant standard to be whether the change is "consistent with the aims of the decree." 
128 F. Supp. at 935. This statement of the standard seems wrong, and the court did not even 
mention Swift 
48. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 116-17 (1982); Note, supra note 8; Note, 
Flexibility and Finality, supra note 14, at 1303; Note, Requests by the Government for Modifica-
tion of Consent Decrees, 75 YALE L.J. 657 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, Requests by the 
Government for Modifications]. 
49. 316 U.S. 556 (1942). 
50. Chrysler, 316 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added). The consent decree in Chrysler was set to 
lapse on Jan. 1, 1941, unless the government obtained similar relief against General Motors. The 
government later realized it could not obtain relief by that date, and it petitioned the court to 
extend the date to Jan. 1, 1942. Chrysler opposed the modification. 
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It is unclear, however, whether this "basic purpose" standard sur-
vives the Supreme Court's decision in Ford Motor Co. v. United 
States. 51 Ford involved the same consent decree that the government 
had been successful in modifying just six years earlier in Chrysler. In 
Ford, however, the Court refused to grant the modification, despite the 
government's claim that such a modification would carry out the pur-
pose of the original decree. 52 This seemingly contradictory decision 
led one commentator to note that "whatever liberalization [in the stan-
dard for government-initiated modifications] one reads into Chrysler 
must be largely read out of Ford . ... "53 
Despite the Ford decision, the Justice Department has urged that a 
standard similar to the one enunciated in Chrysler apply to govern-
ment-initiated modifications. In a 1959 congressional report, the De-
partment cited Hughes v. United States 54 and Liquid Carbonics Corp. 
v. United States 55 for the proposition that a consent decree may not be 
converted into "a license to a defendant to continue in violation of the 
law."56 If the government is able to demonstrate that "additional relief 
[is] absolutely necessary to preserve competition and prevent monop-
oly,"57 modification should be permitted over the defendant's objec-
tions. This standard is akin to Chrysler's "basic purpose" standard, 
and is far removed from Swift's requirement that changed circum-
stances, extreme hardship, and unforseeability be demonstrated. 58 In 
light of Ford, however, it is unclear whether the present Court would 
apply a test similar to the one advocated by the Justice Department. 
3. Consented-To Modifications 
Most courts that have granted consented-to modifications have 
51. 335 U.S. 303 (1948). 
52. Ford, 335 U.S. at 321. 
53. Note, Flexibility and Finality, supra note 14, at 1313. 
54. 342 U.S. 353 (1952). Hughes involved a consent decree that required Howard Hughes 
either to dispose of certain stock or to deposit it with a trustee. Hughes decided to deposit the 
stock with a trustee. The district court, on a government motion and without a hearing, ordered 
Hughes to divest. The court claimed that it was merely construing the decree. The Supreme 
Court reversed, asserting that the "construction" was in reality a modification. In dicta, how-
ever, the court added that "[w]e entertain no doubt concerning the District Court's power to 
require sale of Hughes' stock after a proper hearing." 342 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added). 
55. 350 U.S. 869 (1955). The Justice Department claimed that Liquid Carbonic "was on all 
fours with Hughes." 1959 REPORT, supra note 1, at 6 (quoting Consent Decree Program of the 
Dept. of Justice, 1958: Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3749 (1958)). In Liquid Carbonic, the Court (per curiam) cited 
Hughes in reversing and remanding for a hearing on the modification issue. 
56. 1959 REPORT, supra note 1, at 6 (quoting Consent Decree Program of the Dept. of Justice, 
1958: Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 
2d Sess. 3749 (1958)) (emphasis in original omitted). 
57. Id. (emphasis in original omitted). 
58. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text. 
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used a public interest standard, 59 at least for those decrees modified 
after enactment of the APP A. 60 The standard is extremely deferential 
to the Justice Department's determination of the public interest.61 
The decisions typically indicate that the court has considered all the 
papers submitted and found the modifications to be in the public inter-
est. 62 The cases do not, however, reflect any intense inquiry into the 
public interest. 63 
59. See, e.g., Unikel States v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 66,060 (N.D. 
Cal.); United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 65,824 (N.D. Tex. 
1983); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 65,710 (N.D. Ind.); United 
States v. Aerofin Corp., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1162,598 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. General 
Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 61,660 (E.D. Pa.). 
The public interest standard is the standard that the APPA requires a court to use in entering 
an initial consent decree. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text. Regular use of a public 
interest standard for consented-to modifications is a relatively new development, probably in 
response to the APPA. In Motor Vehicles and AT&T. courts used the public interest standard by 
applying the APP A. See notes 18-26 supra and accompanying text. Other courts simply apply a 
public interest standard on their own. See United States v. Swift & Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) 11 60,201, at 65,703 (N.D. Ill.) ("[T]he court is empowered to implement a procedure 
designed to produce, in the public interest, an agreed modification that 'enjoy[s] a solid presump-
tion that it was founded in fact and supported by reason.'") (quoting Swift & Co. v. United 
States, 189 F. Supp. 885, 906 (N.D. Ill. 1960)). 
The APPA appears to have influenced the 1975 Swift decision. In addition to examining the 
public interest, the court required publication of the proposed modification, arguing that "the 
court is ... obligated to insure that the public .•• [has] received adequate notice of the pro-
posed modification .... " 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1160,201, at 65,703. Though the court's insis-
tence on publication might have been based on the APP A, the mandated procedures were not as 
demanding as those established by the APP A. 
In 1980, Swift again came back for modification. The case went before the same judge, but on 
this occasion the court did not order publication. Instead, "having considered the matter and 
being duly advised," it modified the decree. 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1163,185, at 77,907 (N.D. 
Ill.). Finally, in 1981, the parties moved for termination of the decree, which the court granted. 
It is not clear what (if any) publication procedures the court required or what information the 
court considered. The court terminated the decree "following full and adequate notice to all 
parties in interest and to the public of the proposed entry • • . and after hearing duly held • • • 
and the Court being duly advised and having considered the matter .... " Swift, 1982-1 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) 11 64,464, at 72,602 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
60. Courts that ordered consented-to modifications before the APP A generally did not men-
tion the public interest. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) 11 65,378 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
1175,391 (E.D. Mich.); United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
11 74,794 (N.D. Ohio). This does not mean that no court used a public interest standard. See 
United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942), appeal dismissed, 318 U.S. 
796 (1943). Prior to the APPA, however, a public interest standard was not nearly as 
widespread. 
61. This may be partly a result of the Justice Department's current procedures. Though the 
APP A does not apply, the Department has nevertheless been complying substantially with the 
Act's procedures in consented-to modifications. See note 27 supra. 
62. The courts that come under this category have used remarkably similar language. See, 
e.g., United States v. Witco Chem. Corp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1164,591 (W.D. Penn. 1981) 
(The court modified the decree after considering "the defendant's Motion • • • and the papers 
submitted ... and having determined that it is in the public interest that the Final Judgment be 
modified . . . ."). 
63. See cases cited at note 59 supra. 
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II. THE UNIFORM CONCERNS 
As Part I of this Note demonstrates, courts have applied consider-
ably different standards to consented-to modifications64 than to either 
government-sought6S or defendant-souglit66 modifications. This Part 
argues that there is little justification for these differing standards. 
First, the section compares consented-to with government-sought 
modifications. Second, it compares government-sought with defen-
dant-sought modifications. Finding no differences that warrant the 
application of three distinct substantive standards, this Note recom-
mends that courts focus on the same concerns in deciding whether to 
modify any consent decree. 
A. Consented-To and Government-Sought Modifications 
There is no compelling reason for drawing a distinction between 
consented-to and government-sought modifications. Consented-to 
modifications, it is true, are sought with the defendant's consent; 
whereas government-initiated modifications may be granted in the ab-
sence of such consent. Because of the nature of antitrust defendants, 
however, it can be strongly argued that the presence or absence of the 
defendant's consent should not be considered in deciding whether to 
modify a consent decree. As a general proposition, an antitrust de-
fendant puts its own interest first and is primarily concerned with es-
caping judicial sanction. 67 Therefore, the defendant's consent should 
be factored out, and the focus should be placed on the justifications for 
modification proffered by the government. The government's desire 
for modification, after all, is the common element in consented-to and 
government-sought modifications. In both types of cases, it is as-
sumed that the Justice Department is participating in order to advance 
the public interest. 68 If a court refuses to consider the defendant's self-
interested position, the public interest is made the paramount concern, 
64. See notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text. 
65. See notes 48-58 supra and accompanying text. 
66. See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text. 
67. Cf. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 91 (statement of T. Kauper, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Antitrust Div.): 
Congress did not determine that the public interest would be best protected by the employ-
ees of the defendant, by the stockholders or creditors of the defendant, by the suppliers or 
customers of the defendant, by its competitors or by interest groups - all of whom have 
from time to time sought to intervene in consent decree proceedings. Each of these groups, 
after all, has a very particularized interest, an interest frequently far different from that of 
the public. 
68. Congress determined . . • that this crucial law enforcement role should be vested in 
the chief law enforcement officer of the land - appointed subject to the advice and consent 
of the Senate - and accountable to the President. This is recognized by the courts, which 
have said that it is the "United States which must alone speak for the public interest" in 
antitrust matters. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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and it becomes unnecessary to distinguish between the two types of 
modifications. 
The argument for a more cursory examination in consented-to 
cases rests on the notion that a consent decree is a contract between 
the government and the defendant, and that parties to a contract are 
free to modify the provisions of an agreement between them. To be 
sure, a consent decree does resemble a contract. 69 The parties to the 
action negotiate the decree, with either party free to withdraw from 
negotiations and go to trial. The defendant bargains to accept the de-
cree in exchange for the government settling the case; the government 
bargains to settle the case in response to the defendant's acceptance 
and its waiver of a right to trial. 10 
When the consent decree is entered by the court, however, it be-
comes much more than a mere agreement. Where the parties were 
once free to negotiate, they are now held to the terms of the decree.71 
Thus, by entering a consent decree, a court solidifies that decree and 
gives it the stamp of judicial authority. 
In United States v. Swift & Co., 72 the Supreme Court explicitly re-
jected the notion that a consent decree should be treated as a contract 
and not as a judicial act. 73 Demonstrating the proper respect for a 
judicial act, the Court declined to alter "what was decreed after years 
of litigation with the consent of all concerned."74 Since a consent de-
cree is a judicial act, rather than a contract, it should not matter 
whether the defendant consents to the modification. A judicial act 
must be treated as the edict of the court, not as an agreement subject 
to modification according to the desires of the original parties. 
B. Government-Sought and Defendant-Sought Modifications 
There is also little justification for distinguishing between contested 
modifications on the basis of whether they are sought by the govern-
ment or the defendant.75 This proposition follows from the logic of 
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Swift & Co., 76 which 
69. See Handler, supra note 4, at 33 ("[A] consent decree partakes of the features of both 
contract and judicial act. It is not to be treated as merely one or the other, but rather as a hybrid 
of the two."). 
·10. "[T]he defendant has, by the decree, waived his right to litigate the issues raised, a right 
guaranteed to him by the Due Process Clause .... " United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 
673, 682 (1971). 
71. Armour, 402 U.S. at 682. 
72. 286 U.S. 106 (1932). 
73. 286 U.S. at 115. 
74. 286 U.S. at 119. 
75. See Handler, supra note 4, at 19-34; Note, The Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees, 
63 HARV. L. REV. 320 (1949). 
76. 286 U.S. 106 (1932). 
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involved a defendant-sought modification.77 Swift's mandate that a 
court refuse to modify a consent decree without the appropriate show-
ing of changed circumstances, grievous harm, and unforeseeability7B 
was responsive to the judicial nature of a decree. 79 But a judicial act 
is no less so because the government, rather than the defendant has 
sought the modification. 
The Justice Department asserts that the Supreme Court's decisions 
in Hughes v. United StatesB0 and Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. United 
StatesB1 relaxed the standard for government-sought contested modifi-
cations. B2 Reliance on these cases to support the Department's posi-
tion is misplaced. The Court's statement in Hughes acknowledging 
the power of the district court to modify a decree at the behest of the 
governmentB3 was merely dicta, and the case did not even mention 
Swift. Liquid Carbonic relied solely on Hughes and was a mere one 
paragraph per curiam opinion. B4 
Finally, the Justice Department's position cannot be justified by 
reference to the Court's decision in Chrysler Corp. v. United States, Bs 
which held that a government-initiated modification is appropriate if it 
would "effectuate or . . . thwart the basic purpose of the original con-
sent decree."B6 First, as noted above, Ford Motor Co. v. United 
States,B7 severely limits (and possibly overrules) Chrysler.BB In addi-
tion, Chrysler's "basic purpose" test is entirely inconsistent with 
United States v. Armour & Co., B9 in which the Court expressly rejected 
the notion that a consent decree can even have a purpose.90 Only a 
litigated decree, not a consent decree, can be said to have a "purpose." 
77. See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text. 
78. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119. 
79. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text. 
80. 342 U.S. 353 (1952). See note 54 supra. 
81. 350 U.S. 869 (1955). See note 55 supra. 
82. See 1959 REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-6 (quoting Consent Decree Program of the Dept. of 
Justice, 1958: Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3749 (1958)). 
83. See note 54 supra. The Court may only have meant that a district court is empowered to 
modify a consent decree after a hearing that has addressed the Swift concerns. 
84. The Court remanded the case for a hearing and did not reach the merits of the dispute. 
350 U.S. 869 (1955). 
85. 316 U.S. 556 (1942). See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text. 
86. Chrysler, 316 U.S. at 562. See also text at notes 48-50 supra. 
87. 335 U.S. 303 (1948). 
88. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text. 
89. 402 U.S. 673 (1971). 
90. 402 U.S. at 681-82 ("[T]he decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the 
parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as 
much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to 
achieve.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). As one author points out, "it may be con-
cluded that in such a case the only true purpose of the decree is in settlement of the government 
action." Handler, supra note 4, at 32 n.202. 
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In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 91 the government 
sought to modify a litigated decree. In that context the Supreme 
Court was willing to hold that the Swift standard did not apply. 
United Shoe, the Court argued, was the obverse of Swift. In Swift, the 
defendants had "sought relief not to achieve the purposes . . . of the 
decree, but to escape [its] impact."92 Since, in United Shoe, the gov-
ernment sought to effectuate the purposes of the decree, modification 
was proper.93 
United Shoe is inapposite, however, to modifications of consent de-
crees. A litigated decree is forced on the defendant without his or her 
consent, after the defendant has been found guilty. There is a record 
with which to find a purpose for the decree. A consent decree, how-
ever, has no purpose94 and no record. Moreover, the defendant has 
exchanged his right to trial for settlement of the case.95 A consent 
decree is therefore not like a litigated decree, and different standards 
should apply in the two contexts. 
III. THE DOUBLE-BARREL STANDARD 
Given that uniform concerns exist in all modification cases, it be-
comes necessary to define exactly what these concerns should be. This 
section argues that even though the APP A does not apply to modifica-
tions, its concern for the public interest is important and should be 
integrated into the adopted standard. On the other hand, this section 
contends that considering the public interest alone is insufficient. It 
proposes a new standard - the double-barrel standard - that consid-
ers both the public interest and the necessary respect for judicial 
acts.96 
91. 391 U.S. 244 (1968). 
92. 391 U.S. at 249. 
93. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969) (it is 
unnecessary to show changed circumstances to win modification of a litigated decree). 
94. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text. 
95. See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971). See also Handler, supra 
note 4, at 33: 
To open the floodgates for modification would be, in effect, to invite the government to make 
concessions in order to induce the defendant to enter a consent decree and then, subse-
quently, to renege on its bargain by attempting to add to the decree the very restrictions that 
the defendant opposed. 
96. The Swift standard- that "[n]othing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked 
by new and unforseen conditions should lead [a court] to change what was decreed after years of 
litigation with the consent of all concerned," 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) - is an example of a 
standard that represents respect for a judicial act. Cf. Note, Requests By the Governme11t for 
ModijicatiollS of Conse11t Decreees, supra note 48, at 659 ("To some extent, [the policies underly-
ing Swift] are the same considerations that underlie the doctrine of res judicata."). 
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A. The Desirability of a Public Interest Test 
Although the APPA does not apply to modifications,97 some of the 
assumptions evident in the Act and expressed in the legislative history 
are relevant in evaluating modifications. One of these assumptions is 
that the Justice Department handles antitrust matters with an eye to-
ward the public interest.98 Many of the courts that have modified con-
sent decrees99 after enactment of the APP A have borrowed its public 
interest standard. I00 Even before the adoption of the APP A, one 
court held that the public interest should be considered in all modifica-
tion proceedings. IOI 
There are problems, though, with focusing solely on the public in-
terest. One of these problems is that a court is not in a good position 
to make an independent public interest determination. A court must 
therefore rely to a great extent on the Justice Department's conception 
of the public interest. Reliance on the Justice Department, however, 
ignores the judicial nature of consent decrees. 
1. Court-Initiated Public Interest Determinations 
Requiring a court to make a public interest determination presents 
a potential separation of powers problem.102 The dissent in Maryland 
97. See notes 1341 supra and accompanying text. 
98. See House Hearings, supra note 36, at 38 (statement of Sen. Tunney) ("The clandestine 
nature of [consent decree] negotiations and the unsatisfactory results in many antitrust cases, 
both from the standpoints of economics and law, has contributed to the severe erosion of public 
confidence in the governmental process, has produced undesirable economic consequences, and 
ultimately has hurt the public pocketbook."); Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of 
Sen. Tunney) (The Act "focuses on the process by which antitrust suits are settled and consent 
judgments entered by providing specific standards and procedures to assure that the decision to 
settle and the settlement itself are in fact in the public interest.") (emphasis added). 
99. At least consented·to modifications. 
100. See United States v. Swift & Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1J 60,201 (N.D. Ill.), for a 
case that applied a public interest standard in a more than cursory way; see also United States v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 719 F.2d 558, 565 n.7 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Although, by its terms, the 
[APPA] is not applicable to a termination proceeding, it provides useful guidance to the courts in 
deciding how modification procedures should be addressed."), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1596 
(1984). 
Most courts, however, use a public interest standard that defers to the Justice Department's 
determination of the public interest. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text. 
101. United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 46 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D. Del. 1942) ("[T]he 
modification or vacation of a consent decree previously entered involves the same duty of the 
court independently to determine that the action is equitable and in the public interest."), appeal 
dismissed, 318 U.S. 796 (1943). 
102. Some of the legislative history behind the APP A reflects a concern for the separation of 
powers problem. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1974) ("[T]o require 
federal courts to determine whether a consent decree is in the public interest is to transfer an 
'executive' question to the courts for resolution."); Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 71 (state-
ment of R. Hammond, atty.): 
Our judicial system is well designed and performs well with regard to a particular function, 
that is, deciding controversies on an adjudicated record. I don't think the courts have any 
special expertise, which absent a record, enables them to second guess the Department [of 
Justice] •.• and make a judgment whether a consent decree is in the public interest. 
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v. United States 103 asserted that a public interest standard "requires an 
evaluation of an initial policy decision - whether the benefits that 
might be obtained in a lawsuit are worth the risks and costs - that is 
clearly for non-judicial discretion."104 Policy determinations, the dis-
sent argued, are normally reserved for other branches of the 
govemment. 105 
Maryland v. United States dealt with the public interest review 
mandated by the APPA. The APPA, however, does not apply to the 
modification of consent decrees. 106 It is one thing for a court to under-
take a public interest determination when instructed to do so by Con-
gress. However, in the absence of statutory authority a judicially 
initiated public interest review raises serious separation of powers 
concems.107 
2. Government-Controlled Public Interest Determinations 
There are also problems with using a government-controlled public 
interest determination as the sole basis for modification. Such a stan-
dard would require the courts to defer to the Justice Department's 
See also Senate Hearings, supra, at 77 (statement of J. Campbell, atty.) ("[T]he court's role in 
approving settlements is, in the nature of things, a very limited one. In the first place, the court 
can only go so far in second-guessing the [Justice Department's determination] that a proposed 
consent decree is [in the public interest]."); House Hearings, supra note 36, at 41 (statement of 
Rep. Hutchinson) ("I am troubled by the suggestion that a federal judge act as guardian of the 
'public interest.' I wonder whether in our system of government a federal judge can, or should, 
make such decisions.''). 
103. 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (mem.), ajfg. sub nom. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 
(D.D.C. 1982). 
104. 460 U.S. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
105. See Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 240 (1920) ("Questions of policy are not submitted 
to judicial determination, and the courts have no general authority of supervision over the exer-
cise of discretion which under our system is reposed in the people or other departments of gov-
ernment."); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
("Formation of policy is a legislature's primary responsibility, entrusted to it by the elector-
ate ... .''). But see In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 911-12 (Regional Rail 
Reorg. Ct. 1974) (The Regional Railroad Reorganization Act required a court to find that "the 
public interest would be better served by [reorganization under bankruptcy laws] than by a reor-
ganization under this act" in order to utilize the Bankruptcy Act. The trustee in bankruptcy 
claimed that such a finding was legislative and not judicial. Judge Friendly rejected the 
argument.). 
106. See notes 18-41 supra and accompanying text. 
107. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962), the Supreme Court discussed at length 
the notion that certain questions are "political" and thus best left to the executive and legislative 
branches. The Court said that "prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department .... " 369 U.S. at 217. The Court also listed several other factors that 
render a question "political" and hence nonjusticiable. Two of these are directly relevant to 
public interest determinations: (1) "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving [the issue];" and (2) "the impossibility of deciding without an inital policy determi-
nation of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.'' The judiciary has no special expertise in 
determining "the public interest" and cannot ever establish criteria to apply. It should therefore 
allow the political branches of government to make such determinations. 
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assessment of what the public interest requires. 108 Though partial reli-
ance on the Department's superior resources and expertise is desirable, 
complete reliance ignores the fears that led Congress to enact the 
APPA. 
The executive branch (and by implication the Justice Department) 
is under a duty to assure that "the laws [of the United States] be faith-
fully executed."109 It is unrealistic for a court to ignore the Justice 
Department's duty to protect the public interest110 and to forget that 
the Justice Department has superior policymaking resources. Courts 
should be somewhat deferential to the Department's assessment of the 
public interest. 
Too much deference, however, might violate the policies and prin-
ciples underlying the APP A. Congress passed the APP A partly in 
response to consent decrees entered in United States v. Western Elec-
tric Co., 111 United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 112 and United States 
v. ITT. 113 Members of Congress believed that courts were giving too 
much deference to Justice Department determinations of whether to 
sign consent decrees. 114 
The danger that judicial deference to the government may lead to 
unfair modifications is partly mitigated by current Department proce-
dures in modification cases. The Justice Department substantially 
complies with the APP A procedures.115 As long as the Department 
108. This is what most courts do when they order consented-to modifications. See notes 59-
63 supra and accompanying text. 
109. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 3. 
110. See Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Na-
ture of Antitrust Law, 25 CORP. PRAC. CoMMENTATOR 155, 181 (1983): 
Of course, each branch of government must give due regard to the constitutional functions 
of its coordinate branches. Thus, executive agencies must be highly respectful of the views 
of the courts, the interpretative body in government. But the judiciary must also carefully 
consider the executive branch's views. The courts must remember that, unlike private liti-
gants, the executive branch is obligated to use its prosecutorial discretion to bring only cases 
that promote the public interest • • . . When the executive branch brings a case, it repre-
sents not only its belief that the courts should examine the challenged conduct for possible 
illegality, but also that the rules oflaw it seeks to apply are in the public interest both for the 
instant case and for subsequent prosecutions. 
(emphasis in original). 
111. 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 68,246 (D.NJ.). 
112. No. 14060 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1941), vacated, No. 14060 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 1982). 
113. 349 F. Supp. 22 (D. Conn. 1972), affd. sub nom. Nader v. United States, 410 U.S. 919 
(1973); see generally note 13 supra. 
114. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 36, at 39 (testimony of Sen. Tunney) ("I feel that 
[consent decress are] subject to the possibility of abuse unless you have a complete ventilation of 
what is going on behind closed doors, and unless the public is made aware of what the nature of 
the ••. agreement is."); Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 147 (statement of Judge Wright) ("By 
definition, antitrust violators wield great influence and economic power. They can often bring 
significant pressure to bear on Government . . . in connection with the handling of consent 
decrees."). By forcing the government to follow the APPA procedures, courts would have more 
control over the entry of a consent decree. 
115. See note 27 supra. 
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continues this policy, the fears that led to the enactment of the APPA 
are allayed. But since the APPA does not apply116 the Department is 
free to disregard its current policy. There is a need, then, for some 
judicial review to act as a check on the Department's practices. 
B. Respect for a Judicial Act 
Though it is necessary to take account of the public interest before 
modifying a consent decree,117 considering only the public interest ig-
nores the judicial nature of consent decrees. A consent decree is a 
judicial act, 118 and a court should modify it only if the modification 
will respect the judicial nature of the decree.119 This is so regardless of 
whether the modification serves the public interest.120 
"Respect for a judicial act" is not mere verbiage or rhetoric. In 
order to preserve respect for its prior orders, a court should modify a 
decree only if the decree is operating inequitably. This proposition 
accords with the concerns enunciated in Swift. 121 Hardship to the par-
ties is the most important element, 122 and a court should be most sen-
sitive to it. No modification should be granted without a showing of 
hardship. 
IV. APPLYING THE DOUBLE-BARREL STANDARD 
As illustrated in the previous sections, courts should consider the 
same factors in all modification cases. They should, borrowing from 
Swift, show respect for consent decrees as judicial acts, 123 and at the 
same time consider the public interest, as suggested by the APP A. 124 
These concerns place initial responsibility for determining the public 
interest on the government, but make the courts ultimately responsible 
116. See notes 18-41 supra and accompanying text. 
117. See notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text. 
118. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932). 
119. See United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 719 F.2d 558, 565 (2d Cir. 1983) 
("[M]odification •.. always requires court approval due to [the] quasi-judicial nature [of con-
sent decrees]. Such approval would be meaningless ifthe court were to serve merely as a rubber 
stamp of modifications agreed to by the parties."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1596 (1984). 
120. See United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 46 F. Supp. 654, 655 (D. Del. 1942), appeal 
dismissed, 318 U.S. 796 (1943): 
The fact that the court may consider the opinion of the Department of Justice to the same 
effect [that the decree is in the public interest] does not mean that the court has abdicated its 
power, or failed to carry out its responsibility, to make an independent determination of the 
propriety and equity of the decree proposed by the parties. 
121. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119. See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text. 
122. Although Swift discussed changed circumstances and unforeseeability, it is clear that 
the Court looked more toward hardship. "No doubt the defendants will be better off if the 
injunction is relaxed, but they are not suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to justify 
us in saying that they are the victims of oppression." Swift, 286 U.S. at 119. 
123. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text. 
124. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. 
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for ensuring respect for judicial acts. The focus is uniform and should 
be applied to all types of consent decree modifications.125 
The previous section sets out the substantive issues courts should 
examine in deciding whether to modify consent decrees. Though they 
present uniform concerns, consented-to, government-sought, and de-
fendant-sought modifications should not necessarily receive identical 
treatment from the courts. Indeed, the Justice Department's position 
concerning the propriety of modification should be critical in deter-
mining whether modification is granted. After all, the antitrust divi-
sion of the Justice Department is charged with protecting the public 
interest. 126 Since the double-barrel standard requires courts to con-
sider whether a modification is in the public interest, courts should 
give presumptive weight to the government's view on this issue.127 
The defendant, on the other hand, is only concerned with its own prof-
itability, and thus its position as to the propriety of the modification 
should not be accorded any deference.128 Therefore, while courts 
should examine the same factors in all modification cases, the pre-
sumptions should vary depending on whether the Justice Department 
supports the motion. 
Under the double-barrel standard, then, the Justice Department's 
action will create a rebuttable presumption that the modification is or 
is not in the public interest. The court, in tum, will look to the contin-
uing equity of the decree. Below is an analysis of how the standard 
would work with regard to the different types of modifications: 
Consented-To Modifications. (1) The Justice Department's con-
sent will establish a presumption that the modifications are in the pub-
lic interest. Since the defendant in consented-to cases will not attempt 
to rebut this presumption, the court should be willing to hear the 
views of third parties. (2) The Department and/or the defendant 
must show hardship. The Department would show hardship to the 
public. The defendant would show hardship to itself. 
Government-Sought, Without Defendant's Consent. (1) The De-
partment's action will again establish a presumption that the modifica-
tion is in the public interest, which the defendant (and third parties) 
will be free to rebut. (2) The Department must also show hardship. 
Defendant-Sought, Without the Government's Consent. (1) The 
Justice Department's lack of consent will create a presumption that 
the modification would not be in the public interest. The defendant 
125. See Part II supra. 
126. See note 68 supra and accompanying text. 
127. The superior resources of the Justice Department in making such determinations man-
dates such deference. See notes 109-10 supra and accompanying text. In addition, granting such 
a presumption is logical due to the lack of expertise courts have in making public interest deter-
minations. See note 105 supra. 
128. See note 67 supra and accompanying text. 
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has the burden of showing otherwise. (2) The defendant must also 
establish hardship. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that consented-to modifications will 
be easiest to obtain; government-sought less easy; and defendant-
sought, relatively difficult. This accords with what courts have been 
doing under the guise of different standards.129 However, while sug-
gesting presumptions identifying uniform concerns may not lead to 
different results, it does serve the salutary purpose of describing how 
courts should decide whether to grant any type of consent decree 
modification. 
CONCLUSION 
The Justice Department and the courts seem to be at odds regard-
ing the correct standard for granting modifications of antitrust consent 
decrees. This Note has proposed a new standard- the double-barrel 
standard- to guide courts in deciding whether to modify an existing 
decree. Under this standard, a court should modify a decree only if 
the modification advances the public interest and demonstrates respect 
for a prior judicial act. 
- John D. Anderson 
129. See generally Part I.B. supra. 
